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The Evolution Of Offshore:
From Tax Havens To IFCs

By Andrew P. Morriss, Dean of the School of Innovation
and Professor at the Bush School of Government & Public Service
& Charlotte Ku, Professor of Law, Texas A&M University

O

VER THE PAST 70 YEARS,
many smaller jurisdictions
have evolved into international
financial centres (IFCs). Although
different in their historic origins and
in the financial products and services
they offer, IFCs share a common
development path. Understanding
that evolution can shed light on what
the next decade is likely to bring.

Not Being Somewhere Else

Before World War I, the international
financial order was built around the gold
standard; several relatively free trade
zones (the British Empire, the French
colonial empire, the American zone of
influence) and multinational businesses,
including banks serving international
businesses such as First National City
Bank (the forerunner of Citibank),
consumer product companies such as
Unilever, and natural resource producers

such as Royal Dutch/Shell. By the end
of World War II, that financial order
was shattered not only by the war but by
Nazi and Soviet efforts at autarky, tariff
wars, the Great Depression, and the
liquidation of UK overseas assets to pay
for both world wars.
The new global financial order –
constructed under the Bretton Woods
framework established in 1944 – poured
millions in dollars into the world
economy through the Marshall Plan
and US military spending abroad. The
United States enjoyed an export boom
as countries devastated by the war
bought capital goods to rebuild their
economies. Decolonisation prompted
reverse migration from Britain’s newly
independent colonies, with returning
ex-colonials seeking British banking
and financial services inside the sterling
zone, but outside the UK’s high tax
regimes. This demand grew in the

“Legal, accounting, and other financial services
industries grew in these financial centres as
they developed.”

1960s as top marginal tax rates soared
in most developing economies and the
United States began efforts to restrain
foreign access to US capital markets
through voluntary restraints and
mandatory methods such as the Interest
Equalisation Tax. The Eurodollar market
resulted – based in the City of London
but taking advantage of connections to
jurisdictions associated with the UK, but
not in the UK proper.
This situation created opportunities
for jurisdictions that had historic ties to
major economies, but were not subject
to their laws. Such jurisdictions had
rudimentary financial infrastructure
in place to service industries such as
tourism in the Bahamas or the oil
refining industry in Curaçao. These
included the Channel Islands and the
Isle of Man in Europe, Hong Kong in
Asia, Bermuda and other British and
Dutch Caribbean territories in the
Americas. As semi-autonomous units,
these territories were not subject to the
domestic banking reserve requirements
that UK and US banks faced at home
and lacked high direct taxation rates.
The contemporaneous labelling of
these jurisdictions as “tax havens” (in
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what was originally a benign use of the
term) captures their original role as
havens from onerous legal requirements
imposed elsewhere.
Close to major financial markets,
and with sufficient communication
infrastructure, jurisdictions such as
Jersey and the Bahamas established
bank-oriented financial structures that
legally located transactions outside
UK and US domestic regulation.
Jurisdictions such as Curaçao took
advantage of tax treaties like the 1955
extension of the US. -Netherlands treaty
to overseas Dutch territories to create
similar opportunities. Others such as
the Cayman Islands explicitly set out
to develop financial industries with the
encouragement of UK colonial officials
looking for long-term development
strategies. This first stage of development
was characterised by jurisdictions using
their historic statuses and autonomy as,
in effect, a walled garden into which
economic activity could be attracted
by offering protection from other
jurisdictions’ taxes and regulations.
The erosion and then collapse of the
Bretton Woods framework in 1971
created further opportunity. Britain’s
abrupt shrinkage of the sterling
area in 1972 and the termination of
capital and exchange controls in 1979
created demand for ways to hedge the
expanded currency risks of floating
exchange rates.
Domestic financial
systems sought to limit the exposure of
financial institutions as exemplified by
the collapses of the German Herstatt
Bank and the US Franklin National
Bank in 1974. In the meantime, steps
to rebuild the international financial
order, such as the 1988 Basel Accord,
had little immediate impact on offshore
jurisdictions. International focus was on
the risks of expanded cross-jurisdictional
banking,
cross-border
consumer
investment funds (as seen in the
collapse of Bernard Cornfield’s Investors

WHY IS THE
CAYMAN ISLANDS
THE PREMIER GLOBAL
TAX NEUTRAL
FINANCIAL HUB?

“The investments in local legal and regulatory
infrastructure were key to the emergence of these
jurisdictions as places where value was added
to transactions and suitcases of cash were no
longer welcome.”
Overseas Service), and the defaults and
restructurings resulting from the massive
expansion of international lending to
developing countries in the 1970s.
Climbing The Value Chain

Legal, accounting, and other financial
services industries grew in these financial
centres as they developed. The Caymans
went from no lawyers at all in 1960 to
attracting Oxbridge graduates working
at City firms by the early 1970s—no
doubt aided by the dismal economic
conditions, power cuts, and strikes
that plagued Britain during that time.
Armed with this talent, these small island
financial centres began to explore moving
up the value chain in the 1970s and
1980s. They sought to increase profits by
growing both the volume of transactions
and the proportion of each transaction
occurring in their jurisdictions. Thus,
began the transformation of these centres
from offshore regulatory and tax havens
into centres where local law added value
to transactions.
Offshore insurance markets provide
an example. Bermuda developed a role
as an offshore jurisdiction in the 1930s.
In the early 1960s, US lawyer Fred
Reiss chose Bermuda to pioneer the
captive insurance industry, sowing the
seeds for more complex transactions
later. The Cayman Islands persuaded
Harvard’s hospital system to locate its
medical malpractice captive there by
passing an insurance law and taking the
first steps to regulate offshore insurance.

The funds industry sought similar legal
infrastructure in the 1980s, leading these
jurisdictions to pass laws and expand
regulatory infrastructure to support
them. These laws enabled new types of
transactions and screened out bad actors,
making these jurisdictions attractive to
legitimate business.
As an example, the Bahamas passed
almost 20 major financial-servicesrelated statutes in the 1980s and
1990s. These established or revised
legal frameworks to regulate banking,
companies and other business entities,
funds, insurance, and trusts, and created
the infrastructure to collaborate with
international law enforcement efforts to
stop money laundering and corruption.
Other offshore jurisdictions undertook
similarly extensive expansions of their
legal infrastructure.
Offshore jurisdictions also expanded
their
regulatory
infrastructure,
establishing independent regulatory
bodies outside of government, and
separating promotional from regulatory
efforts. Guernsey adopted this strategy
early and created the Guernsey Financial
Services Commission in 1987. Others
soon followed. Expertise for these new
regulatory bodies drew on the British
colonial and Commonwealth practice of
recruiting needed experts from outside
a jurisdiction. This provided access to
internationally recognised and trusted
personnel. For example, among the
six members of the first board of the
Cayman Islands Monetary Authority

As the premier global tax neutral
financial hub, the Cayman Islands
is an extender of value for G20
countries and other developed
and
developing
countries
around the world, their
businesses and their people,
to
efficiently participate in
trade, investment and financing
opportunities around the world.

Excellence. Innovation. Balance.
www.caymanfinance.ky
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Scan to learn more about the Cayman
Islands Financial Services Industry.
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“The next generation of international regulations
will add to pressures to homogenise IFCs’ offerings
and to raise their costs of doing business.”
The Expansion Of International
Regulatory Efforts

Initially focused on the erosion of
the tax base and money laundering of
the proceeds of crime, international
regulatory efforts turned to security
concerns after 9/11. This enhanced
regulatory regime required IFCs
to continue adding to their legal
infrastructure to compete for business.
For example, the Bahamas passed
more than 10 major statutes to address
new international requirements after
2001 in addition to updating existing
laws. IFCs also had to commit
resources to interacting with new
regulatory regimes, such as MoneyVal
for European jurisdictions or the
Caribbean Financial Action Task
Force for Caribbean jurisdictions,
and with private standard-setters
like the International Organization
of Securities Commissions and
the International Association of
Insurance Supervisors. Jurisdictions
were incurring new expenses without
receiving comparable benefits or
advantage in return.
The transformation of obligations
from the friction-reducing provisions
in bilateral tax and investment treaties
to
friction-increasing
provisions
imposed as part of an international
regulatory regime is one of the major
differences between the pre- and
post-2001 worlds. Added to the
new costs of post-9/11 international
regulation is the more organised anticompetitive measures from onshore
competitors. Blacklists of “noncooperative jurisdictions” by individual
governments and the European Union

are an important example. These
blacklists are rarely developed openly,
lack clear criteria, and, in the EU’s
case, appear to be applied preferentially
by excluding EU members whose
practices are hard to distinguish from
blacklisted non-members. The United
States directly imposed costs on other
jurisdictions by leveraging its position
in the international financial system
to conclude agreements with 113
countries and jurisdictions requiring
foreign financial institutions to report
on assets held by U.S. taxpayers under
the Foreign Account Tax Compliance
Act (FATCA).
The Outlook For The 2020s

The landscape faced by IFCs in the
2020s is demanding. Not only must
they continue developing new products
to maintain competitiveness, but they
will have to meet new international
requirements including a growing onshore
interest in the establishment of public
beneficial ownership registers. The task is
sufficiently difficult that no jurisdiction,
onshore or offshore, has yet produced
an accurate and public register. The next
generation of international regulations
will add to pressures to homogenise IFCs’
offerings and to raise their costs of doing
business. This emerging regulatory regime
will require concerted efforts by IFCs
collectively to preserve their autonomy and
prevent their onshore competitors from
regulating them out of business. While
IFCs have been successful innovators
individually, collaborating with each other
is in its infancy. Expanding their ability
to collaborate and compete is the next
challenge in their development.
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(established 1997) were a UK Financial
Services Authority employee, a Canadian
banking supervisor, and a retired senior
partner of KPMG Peat Marwick; three
of the six had received honours from
the UK government. Jurisdictions
also started case-by-case information
exchanges with other jurisdictions
through treaties (e.g. the Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaty negotiated in the 1980s
between the UK on behalf of Cayman
and the United States).
The investments in local legal and
regulatory infrastructure were key to
the emergence of these jurisdictions
as places where value was added to
transactions and suitcases of cash
were no longer welcome. In contrast
to simply enabling avoidance of
onshore regulations or taxes, offshore
statutes now provided for varied and
higher quality business structures than
those available onshore. For example,
Guernsey pioneered the protected cell
company structure for insurance in
1997. That legislation quickly spread to
other jurisdictions and also began to be
used for funds. Jersey’s 1984 substantive
(and not simply procedural) Trust
Law created a statutory framework
that increased certainty of outcomes,
making trusts more attractive to noncommon law jurisdiction clients. This
idea also spread to other offshore
financial centres.
By the end of the 1990s, successful
offshore
jurisdictions
offered
distinctive value to their transactions
and became factors in a more complex
international regulatory environment.
Onshore
jurisdictions
became
concerned that offshore competition
was eroding their fiscal autonomy and
diminishing their regulatory efforts.
Both individually and collectively
by using the OECD to coordinate,
onshore jurisdictions sought controls
over what they labelled “harmful tax
VISTRA026_Quarter_AD_V2_AW.pdf 1 14/11/2019 12:18
practices”
in 1998.

